Unnecessary, destabilising and expensive-The pursuit of nuclear-armed submarines reflects a security assessment that is becoming increasingly irrelevant

• A nuclear submarine is fuelled by an onboard nuclear reactor, which allows it to operate underwater for long periods of time.
• In contrast, a conventional diesel submarine uses batteries to operate underwater, but is forced to surface periodically to recharge its batteries using diesel-combustion engines that require oxygen.
• Strategic Submarine Ballistic Nuclear(SSBN) were first deployed during the Cold War and justified as a tool of last resort.
• If an adversary were to launch a devastating first-strike on a country, destroying its land-based missiles and paralysing its air force, the submarine — undetected at sea — could still deliver a counter-strike, assuring the “mutual destruction” of both countries.

        Indian context

• However, this strategic function makes little sense in the modern Indian context..
• There is no realistic threat, which the Arihant could counter, that could wipe out India’s existing nuclear deterrent.
• The range of the missiles carried by the Arihant is about 750 km, and so it can only target Pakistan and perhaps China.
• The Pakistan government has threatened to use “tactical nuclear weapons” to counter India’s cold-start doctrine that envisions a limited invasion of Pakistan.
• China has consistently pledged, for more than 50 years, that it will never be the first to use nuclear weapons in a conflict.
• Even if China were to suddenly change its policy, any attempt to disable India’s nuclear weapons would be fraught with unacceptable risks regardless of whether India possesses SSBNs.

        Some risks

• In fact, nuclear-armed submarines increase the risks of an accidental conflict.
• Traditionally, nuclear weapons in India have been kept under civilian control, and separate from their delivery systems.
• However, the crew of a nuclear-armed submarine will have both the custody of nuclear weapons and the ability to launch them at short notice.
• Even though reports suggest that nuclear weapons on Indian SSBNs will be safeguarded by electronic switches, called “permissive action links”, such a setup can dangerously weaken the civilian command-and-control structure, as declassified documents from the Cuban missile crisis show.

        Prohibitive costs

• Given its uncertain, and even adverse, impact on the country’s security, it is especially important to examine the costs of the SSBN programme.
• Media reports suggest that the Indian Navy would eventually like about four SSBNs.
• The government has not released precise figures, but the international experience can be used to estimate the costs of such a fleet.
• The Indian submarines will be smaller, and perhaps cheaper.
• However, even if their costs are only half as large as the lower end of the British and American estimates, the total cost of maintaining a fleet of four SSBNs, over a 40-year life cycle, will be at least Rs.3 lakh crore.
• It is senseless to spend this money on nuclear submarines when thousands of lives are lost each year because the state pleads that it lacks resources for basic health care and nutrition.

The Hindu